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Following the move to generalized floating in 1973, United States
inflation accelerated, interest rates rose, the value of the dollar in the
market for foreign exchange fluctuated and the volatility of exchange
rates between the United States dollar and major foreign currencies
reached new heights. These developments pose several questions which
are dealt with in this paper.
1 Among these questions are (i) What are the
causes for the large fluctuations in exchange rates? (ii) What are the
causes for the large divergences between the external and internal values
of the dollar? (iii) Have exchange rates fluctuated excessively? (iv) Did
the move to a flexible exchange rate regime contribute to the deteriora-
tion of the dollar? (v) What would be the implications of restoring fixed
parities for the dollar? (vi) What would be the implications of adopting an
intervention rule in the foreign exchange market? (vii) What role could
the external value of the dollar play in determining the course of the
Federal Reserve's policy? and (viii) How could macroeconomic policy
contribute to stabilizing the internal and the external values of the dollar?
9.2 The Record
To set the stage for the analysis it is useful to start with a brief review of
the empirical record. This review concentrates on the evolution and the
interrelation of exchange rates, prices, and interest rates during the
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1970s. Subsequent sections contain the interpretation of these facts as
well as the policy implications.
The first set of relevant facts concerns the turbulence of the foreign
exchange market. A simple measure of such turbulence is the average
absolute monthly percentage changes in the various exchange rates over
some interval of time. Table 9.1 reports such measures for three major
exchange rates: the dollar/pound, the dollar/French franc and the dollar/
DM for the period June 1973-July 1979. In all cases the average absolute
change exceeded 2% per month. In comparison the average absolute
monthly percentage changes of wholesale and consumer price indices and
of the ratios of national price levels were only about half that of the
exchange rate.
The second set of facts concerns the predictability of these changes in
exchange rates. If the forward premium on foreign exchange is regarded
as a measure of the market's prediction of the future change in the
exchange rate, then a comparison between actual changes and the for-
ward premium may reveal the extent to which the market was successful
in predicting these changes. Figures 9.1-9.3 present plots of predicted
and realized monthly percentage changes of exchange rates for the three
pairs of currencies where the predicted change is measured by the lagged
forward premium. The key fact emerging from these figures is that
predicted changes in exchange rates account for a very small fraction of
actual changes. This phenomenon is also reflected in the comparison
between the variances of actual and predicted changes: in all cases the
variances of the monthly percentage changes in exchange rates exceeded
the variances of the monthly forward premiums by a factor larger than 20.
If exchange rates moved in accord with relative national price levels as
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Note: All variables represent the absolute values of monthly percentage changes in the
data. WPI denotes the wholesale price index, and COL denotes the cost-of-living index.
Data on prices and exchange rates are from the IMF tape (May 1979 version). The stock
market indices are from Capital International Perspective, monthly issues.United States Inflation and the Dollar
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Fig. 9.1
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Monthly percentage changes of the US/UK consumer price in-
dices [A In (COLUS/COLUK)] and of the dollar/pound exchange
rate (A In 5,), and the monthly forward premium [In (F,_i/
St-i)], July 1973-July 1979.
volatility of exchange rates would be regarded as a manifestation of the
forces underlying the volatility of national inflation rates and the turbu-
lence of exchange rates would probably not be regarded as an additional
source of social cost. The third set of facts relevant for this issue concerns
the relation between exchange rates and prices. As illustrated in figures
9.1-9.3, short-run changes in exchange rates have not been closely linked
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Fig. 9.2 Monthly percentage changes of the us/France consumer price
indices [A In (COLUS/COLF)] and of the dollar/French franc
exchange rate (A In St), and the monthly forward premium
[In (F,_!/£,_!)], July 1973-July 1979.
Furthermore, this loose link seems to be cumulative. As illustrated in
figures 9.4-9.6, divergences from purchasing power parities, measured in
terms of the relation between exchange rates and the ratio of consumer
price indices, seem to persist.
The fourth and final set of facts concerns the relation between the value
of the dollar and the rate of interest. The record of the 1970s (at least up
to mid-1979) shows that a rise in the rate of interest in the United States193 United States Inflation and the Dollar
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Fig. 9.3 Monthly percentage changes of the us/German consumer
price indices [A In (COLUS/COLG)] and of the dollar/DM ex-
change rate (A In St), and the monthly forward premium
[In (Fj-i/S,-!)], July 1973-July 1979.
(relative to the foreign rate of interest) has been associated with a
depreciation of the dollar. This fact, which is in contrast to the view that a
high interest rate yields a strong dollar, is illustated in figure 9.7.
2 Since
mid-1979 the rise in the United States relative rate of interest has been
associated with an appreciation of the dollar.
In summary, the record of the 1970s shows that (i) the foreign exchange
value of the dollar was highly volatile, (ii) by and large changes in194 Jacob A. Frenkel
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Fig. 9.4 Monthly observations of the dollar/pound spot (In St) and
forward (In Ft) exchange rates and the ratio of the US/UK
cost-of-living indices [In (coLus/coLUK)(scaled to equal the
spot exchange rate at the initial month)], June 1973-July 1979.
exchange rates were unpredictable, (iii) the fluctuations in exchange rates
did not conform closely to movements in national price levels, and (iv) for
most of the 1970s the rise in the United States (relative) rate of interest
was associated with a decline in the foreign exchange value of the dollar,
while beginning in mid-1979 this relationship reversed itself.195 United States Inflation and the Dollar
US/France
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Fig. 9.5 Monthly observations of the dollar/French franc spot (In S,)
and forward (In Ft) exchange rates and the ratio of the
us/French cost-of-living indices [In (coLus/coLF)(scaled to
equal the spot exchange rate at the initial month], June 1973—
July 1979.
9.3 An Interpretation of the Record
In this section I interpret the record of the United States dollar in terms
of the modern "asset market theory" of exchange rate determination.196 Jacob A. Frenkel
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Fig. 9.6 Monthly observations of the dollar/DM spot (In St) and forward
(In Ft) exchange rates and the ratio of the us/German cost-of-
living indices [In (coLus/coLG)(scaled to equal the spot ex-
change rate at the initial month], June 1973-July 1979.
9.3.1 Why Was the Foreign Exchange Value of the
Dollar Volatile and Unpredictable?
The central insight of the modern approach to the analysis of exchange
rates is the notion that the exchange rate, being the relative price of two
durable assets (monies), can be best analyzed within a framework that is
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dictability of price changes are key characteristics of auction and orga-
nized asset markets. In such markets current prices reflect expectations
concerning the future course of events, and new information which
induces changes in expectations is immediately reflected in correspond-
ing changes in prices, thus precluding unexploited profit opportunities
from arbitrage. The strong dependence of current prices on expectations
about the future is unique to the determination of durable asset prices
which are traded in organized exchange; it is less of a characteristic of
price determination of nondurable commodities. The strong dependence
of asset prices on expectations also implies that periods that are domi-
nated by uncertainties, new information, rumors, announcements, or
"news" which induces frequent changes in expectations are likely to be
periods in which asset prices exhibit large fluctuations. It is also likely that
during such periods changes in expectations are the prime cause of the
fluctuations in asset prices. Since exchange rates are viewed as asset
prices, they will also exhibit a relatively large degree of volatility during
periods that are dominated by "news" which alters expectations. Since by
definition the "news" cannot be predicted on the basis of past informa-
tion, it is clear that by and large the fluctuations in exchange rates are
unpredictable.
The evidence lends support to the hypotheses that in recent years the
foreign exchange market behaved as an efficient asset market and that
much of the volatility of exchange rates reflected frequent and large
changes in expectations concerning the future. Forward exchange rates
seem to be unbiased forecasts of future spot rates, and the forecast errors
do not seem to contain systematic patterns which can be used to improve
predictions. However, as indicated in figures 9.1-9.3, the magnitude of
the forecast errors was substantial and only a small fraction of the actual
change in the foreign exchange value of the dollar was accounted for by
the previous period's forward premium or discount on foreign exchange.
The volatility and unpredictability of the foreign exchange value of the
United States dollar are consistent with the interpretation of the role of
"news." They reflect the volatile character of the 1970s, which witnessed
great turbulence in the world economy, large swings in government
policy, and substantial uncertainties about the future course of economic
and political events.
9.3.2 Why Did the Foreign Exchange Value of the Dollar
Deviate from Purchasing Power Parities?
One of the striking facts concerning the relation between the price level
and the foreign exchange value of the dollar during the 1970s (as exhib-
ited in figures 9.1-9.6) has been the poor performance of the predictions
of the simple versions of the purchasing power parity doctrine. As is
known, when applied to aggregate national price levels, purchasing199 United States Inflation and the Dollar
power parities can be expected to hold in the long run only if most of the
shocks to the system are of a monetary origin and do not require changes
in relative prices. To the extent that most of the shocks reflect "real"
changes (like differential growth rates among sectors), the required
changes in sectoral relative prices may result in a relatively loose connec-
tion between exchange rates and aggregate price levels. The 1970s was a
decade in which real shocks were not in shortage. In the context of the
United States dollar, the experience during the 1970s illustrates clearly
the extent to which "real" shocks (the oil embargo, supply shocks,
commodity booms and shortages, shifts in the demand for money, dif-
ferential productivity growth) result in systematic deviations from pur-
chasing power parities. These "real" shocks necessitated changes in real
exchange rates and resulted in the persisting deviations from purchasing
power parities which were illustrated in figures 9.4-9.6.
It is pertinent to note, however, that in addition to these factors there is
a presumption that, at least in the short run, as illustrated by the evidence
in figures 9.1-9.3, exchange rate fluctuations would not be matched by
corresponding fluctuations in aggregate price levels. The arguments in
section 9.3.1 emphasized that in periods which are dominated by "news"
which alters expectations, exchange rates are likely to be highly volatile.
Aggregate price indices on the other hand are not expected to reveal such
a degree of volatility since they reflect the prices of goods and services
which exhibit some "stickiness" and which are less durable and therefore
less sensitive to the "news." It follows therefore that in periods during
which there is ample "news" which induces large fluctuations in exchange
rates, there will also be large deviations from purchasing power parities.
There is thus an intrinsic difference between exchange rates and national
price indices. Exchange rates reflect not only current circumstances but
also expectations concerning the future. In contrast, the prices of national
outputs reflect to a large extent present and past circumstances as they are
embedded in existing contracts. Consequently, when there are large and
frequent changes in expectations, it is likely that the future will be
expected to differ greatly from the present and the past. Under such
circumstances one may find large and frequent deviations from purchas-
ing power parities when the latter are computed using current prices.
9.3.3 Why Did the High Interest Rate Fail to
Strengthen the Dollar?
Prior to accounting for the empirical facts outlined in section 9.2 it is
useful to recall the arguments of the typical analysis which predicts that
high rates of interest are likely to be associated with currencies that are
strong in international money markets. According to the typical explana-
tions a higher rate of interest attracts foreign capital, which induces a
surplus in the capital account of the balance of payments and thereby200 Jacob A. Frenkel
induces an appreciation of the domestic currency. Another variant of this
approach states that the higher rate of interest lowers spending and thus
induces a surplus in the current account of the balance of payments which
results in an appreciation of the currency. A third variant claims that the
higher rate of interest implies (via the interest parity theory) a higher
forward premium on foreign exchange and that, to the extent that at a
given point in time the forward exchange rate is predetermined by past
history (an assumption that is clearly rejected by the evidence on the
co-movements of spot and forward rates, as illustrated in figures 9.4—9.6),
the required rise in the forward premium will be brought about by an
appreciation of the domestic currency. Whatever the route, this approach
predicts a positive relation between the rate of interest and the foreign
exchange value of the domestic currency.
While such a prediction might be appropriate for noninflationary en-
vironments, it is entirely inappropriate for inflationary environments like
the one prevailing in the United States in recent years. Indeed, as
indicated by figure 9.7, this prediction is inconsistent with the record.
During the 1970s (up to mid-1979) the secular rise in the rate of interest in
the United States (relative to the foreign rate of interest) has been
associated with a secular depreciation of the dollar. The same broad facts
emerge from an examination of the circumstances prevailing in a cross
section of countries. Generally, countries with relatively low rates of
interest (Germany, Switzerland) have relatively strong currencies while
countries with relatively high rates of interest (Canada, Italy) have
relatively weak currencies.
The explanation is straightforward. In an inflationary environment the
primary cause for variations in rates of interest is variations in inflationary
expectations. In such an environment a relatively rapid rise in prices is
associated with high nominal rates of interest as well as with a deprecia-
tion of the currency in terms of foreign exchange. In an inflationary
environment a rise in the nominal rate of interest may just compensate
for the erosion of purchasing power without providing for a higher real
return. Under these circumstances, a rise in the United States rate of
interest may not attract foreign capital. Capital markets are much more
sophisticated than what is presumed by some of the simplistic theories.
The evidence indicates that higher nominal rates of interest are associ-
ated with a forward discount on the currency in foreign exchange markets
without necessarily raising real yields and without necessarily attracting
foreign capital (except, possibly, for the very short run). The reversal of
the relation between interest rates and the external value of the dollar
which has taken place in the United States since mid-1979 indicates that
from mid-1979 to the present (mid-1981), the prime cause for the fluctua-
tions in United States interest rates has not been variations in inflationary
expectations but rather variations in the real rate of interest.201 United States Inflation and the Dollar
9.4 Policy Implications
The high and variable world and United States inflation resulted in
high and variable rates of interest and in a depreciated dollar. The
induced turbulence of the foreign exchange value of the United States
dollar as indicated by the large and unpredictable fluctuations, which did
not conform closely to movements in relative national price levels, is
costly. It generates capital gains and losses for holders of assets denomi-
nated in different national monies; it induces asset holders to alter
behavior and expend resources in an attempt to reduce risk; it interferes
with the efficiency of the price system in guiding resource allocation; and
it may result in economically inappropriate patterns of production, con-
sumption, and trade. A relevant question therefore is how can govern-
ment policy be managed to stabilize the dollar and reduce its costly and
undesirable volatility? This section analyzes the implications of alterna-
tive policies.
9.4.1 Implications of Fixed Parities
Very few economists recommend fighting inflation by pegging the price
level through direct intervention in commodity markets. Similar (though
not identical) arguments could be made against fighting the external
depreciation of the dollar by pegging the exchange rate. Both dimensions
of the deteriorating dollar are reflections of macroeconomic policies, and
both can be handled with the aid of macroeconomic policies. Prices and
exchange rates are the manifestation of policies rather than tools that
should be manipulated as instruments of policy.
It is clear that as a technical matter policy can reduce the fluctuations of
the dollar even to the extent of a complete pegging of the rate. If the
source of evil was the variability of exchange rates, then pegging the rate
would have been the simple and feasible solution. The experience with
the Bretton Woods system indicates that this is not the case. It must not
be assumed that policies which are successful in pegging the exchange
rate for a period of time are also successful in eliminating the ultimate
cause that underlies the fluctuations. Such policies may only transfer the
effects of disturbances from the foreign exchange market to somewhere
else in the economic system. For example, it is clear that a commitment to
peg the rate of exchange implies a reduced control over the course of
monetary policy, which would have to be adjusted so as to ensure the
fixity of the rate. In that case the attempt to reduce variability of exchange
rates would result in an increased variability of the money supply. It
follows that the relevant choice is not between costly turbulence and free
tranquility but rather between alternative outlets to the underlying turbu-
lence. This is one of the important constraints that the openness of the
economy to international trade in goods and capital imposes on the202 Jacob A. Frenkel
effectiveness of monetary policy. One could argue, however, that the
obligation to peg the rate would alter the conduct of policy fundamentally
by introducing discipline. Experience seems to suggest, however, that
national governments are unlikely to adjust the conduct of domestic
policies so as to be disciplined by the exchange rate regime. Rather, it is
more reasonable to assume that the exchange rate regime is more likely
to adjust to whatever discipline national governments choose to intro-
duce.
Could one make a case for transferring the effects of disturbances from
the foreign exchange market? Here it is important to emphasize that
there is no presumption that transferring disturbances will reduce their
overall impact and lower their social cost. On the contrary, since the
foreign exchange market is a market in which risk can easily be bought
and sold, it may be sensible to concentrate disturbances in this market
rather than transfer them to other markets, such as labor markets, where
they cannot be dealt with in as efficient a manner.
9.4.2 The Implications of a
Purchasing Power Parity Rule
As was indicated in section 9.2, the foreign exchange value of the
United States dollar has been far more volatile than the various aggregate
price indices. This different degree of volatility resulted in large devia-
tions from purchasing power parities, and by these standards it seems that
exchange rate variations were excessive. In view of the large divergences
from purchasing power parities, various proposals were made concerning
rules for intervention in the foreign exchange market. Some of these
proposals are variants of a purchasing power parity rule according to
which the authorities are expected to intervene in the market for foreign
exchange so as to ensure that the path of exchange rates conforms with
the path of the general price level.
There are fundamental difficulties with a purchasing power parity rule.
First, as indicated in section 9.3.2, there are intrinsic differences between
the characteristics of exchange rates and the price of national outputs.
These differences, which result from the much stronger dependence of
exchange rates (and other asset prices) on expectations, suggest that in
assessing whether exchange rate volatility was excessive, a relevant yard-
stick should be variations in other asset prices like those of securities
rather than variations in price levels. As shown in table 9.1, the variability
of exchange rates was about half that of the various stock market indices.
This of course does not imply that exchange rates as well as stock market
indices have not been too volatile; rather, it indicates that in determining
whether volatility was excessive it is not enough to point to the fact that
exchange rates have moved more than the price level.203 United States Inflation and the Dollar
Second, since in the short run the prices of national outputs do not
adjust fully in response to shocks, intervention in the foreign exchange
market which ensures conformity with purchasing power parities would
be a mistaken course of policy. When commodity prices are slow to adjust
to current and expected economic conditions, it may be desirable to allow
for "excessive" adjustment in some other prices.
Third, it is important to note that changes in real economic conditions
requiring adjustment in the equilibrium relative prices of different
national outputs occur continuously. Under these circumstances what
may seem to be divergences from purchasing power parities may just
reflect equilibrating changes. Further, if there is short-run stickiness of
prices of domestic goods in terms of national monies, then rapid ex-
change rate adjustments are capable of changing the relative prices of
different national outputs and are a desirable response to the changing
real economic conditions. An intervention rule which links changes in
exchange rates rigidly to changes in domestic and foreign prices in accord
with purchasing power parity ignores the occasional need for equilibrat-
ing changes in relative prices.
9.4.3 The Rate of Interest Is a Poor Monetary Indicator
The interpretation of the relation between the rate of interest and the
foreign exchange value of the dollar during the 1970s rested on the
distinction between nominal and real rates of interest—a distinction that
is critical during inflationary periods. That discussion also provides an
illustration of the potential danger in using the wrong monetary indicator.
Traditionally, the criterion for assessing whether monetary policy
was easy or tight has been the height of the rate of interest: a high interest
rate was interpreted as indicating a tight monetary policy while a low
interest rate was interpreted as indicating an easy monetary policy. By
now it is recognized that during an inflationary period it is vital to draw a
distinction between nominal and real rates of interest and, as a result,
during inflationary periods the rate of interest may provide a very mis-
leading interpretation of the stance of monetary policy. The same logic
also applies with respect to the analysis of the relation between exchange
rates and interest rates. A rise in the interest rate will strengthen the
currency if it is due to a rise in the real rate, and it will weaken the
currency if it is due to a rise in inflationary expectations. In this context
inflationary expectations play a central role. As a result, policies which
attempt to induce an appreciation of the dollar could be successful only if
they reduced inflationary expectations. The reduction in inflationary
expectations would halt the depreciation of the currency in terms of
goods and in terms of foreign exchange, and would result in lower
nominal rates of interest while maintaining (or even raising) real rates of
interest.204 Jacob A. Frenkel
9.4.4 Policies Which Reduce Inflation Will
Strengthen the Dollar
The recognition of the link between inflation, the nominal rate of
interest, and the depreciation of the dollar is fundamental for the analysis
of policy. An excessive growth of the supply of dollars relative to the
demand for dollars (for given behavior of foreign monetary aggregates)
reduces the value of the dollar in terms of domestic goods and services (as
reflected by the domestic inflation rate) as well as in terms of foreign
exchange (as reflected by the decline in the external value of the cur-
rency). Since the higher inflation rate and the higher rate of depreciation
of the dollar are both symptoms of the same fundamental cause, there
should be no conflict whatsoever between policies that are aimed at
lowering domestic inflation and policies that are aimed at halting the
external depreciation of the dollar.
Emphasis on the fact that the external and the internal values of the
dollar are both endogenous variables is important in view of the recent
allegation that the move to a regime of flexible exchange rates has been
inflationary. Both the external and the internal values of the dollar
respond to the same set of shocks, and both can be influenced by a similar
set of policies. The finding that typically a depreciation of the external
value of the dollar precedes and exceeds the depreciation of its internal
value does not imply that as an economic matter the chain of causality
runs from exchange rates to prices. Rather, it may just reflect the intrinsic
difference between exchange rates and prices: exchange rates adjust
faster and to a larger extent to shocks than national price levels. It seems
therefore that the attribution of the rise in United States inflation to the
move to a flexible exchange rate regime may reflect to some extent the
fallacy of a belief in post hoc, ergo propter hoc.
The perspective that policies which strengthen the domestic value of
the dollar are consistent with policies which strengthen its external value
implies that the qualitative differences between policies that are intro-
duced through the domestic desk and the external desk at the Fed are not
as large as might have been thought. Domestic monetary policies like
open market operations involve sales (or purchases) of dollars against
securities. External intervention policies like nonsterilized interventions
in foreign exchange markets ultimately involve sales (or purchases) of
dollars against foreign exchange. Both policies result in changes in the
relative supplies of United States dollars, and both therefore are ex-
pected to alter the domestic as well as the external value of the dollar.
Under these circumstances the degree of coordination between the
domestic and the external desks becomes an important issue. It is rel-
evant to note that the degree of coordination between the various activi-
ties of the Fed is also important when the official intervention in foreign
exchange markets alters only the supplies of nonmonetary assets avail-205 United States Inflation and the Dollar
able to the public. Such policies may influence exchange rates through
portfolio effects and possibly more importantly through signaling to the
public the intentions of the government concerning future policies. If the
policies of the domestic and the external desks are coordinated, then such
signals of the external desk of the Fed should be consistent with the
signals provided through the policies of the domestic desk.
The foregoing arguments discussed the role of monetary policy and the
conduct of the Fed. It is important to note that this emphasis does not
reflect the belief that the source of the depreciation of the dollar was
exclusively of a monetary origin. On the contrary, it is clear that "real"
shocks were responsible for a significant share of the economic difficulties
of the 1970s. It is believed, however, that macroeconomic policy can do
little to offset changes in equilibrium levels of real income resulting from
changes in relative prices of internationally traded goods (and the recent
rise in the relative price of oil is a case in point). Further, while the
depreciation might have been caused to some extent by "real" shocks,
there is little doubt that the conduct of monetary policy is critical in
influencing the internal and the external values of the dollar.
9.4.5 The Role of the Dollar in the Design
of Monetary Policy
As was already indicated, exchange rates are influenced by the whole
array of (actual and expected) government policies, especially policies
which affect the demand and supply of different national monies. Ex-
change rates, however, are not instruments of policy that may be manipu-
lated independently of other policy tools.
The close association between policies aimed at lowering inflation and
those aimed at strengthening the dollar in foreign exchange markets
raises the question of the role of the dollar in the design of monetary
policy. It seems that the simultaneous achievement of domestic price
stability and a stable value of the dollar in terms of foreign currencies
need not imply that the external value of the dollar must play an impor-
tant role in guiding the course of monetary policy.
While this implication may seem to be a revival of the "benign neglect"
attitude which became popular during the fixed exchange rate era, the
opposite is the case. One of the major arguments for the "benign neglect"
attitude was that the United States economy was relatively closed and the
foreign trade sector was relatively unimportant. The typical statistic
which was used to justify this position was the low share of imports in GNP.
This argument was inappropriate in the past and is even less appropriate
under present circumstances. The United States has always been an open
economy. The relevant measure of openness to international trade in
goods and services is not the share of actual trade in GNP but rather the
share of tradable commodities in GNP (i.e. of potential trade), which is by206 Jacob A. Frenkel
far larger than that of actual trade. Furthermore, one of the main linkages
of the United States to the world economy is operating through world
capital markets with which the United States is clearly well integrated.
This implication is based on the notion that the United States is an open
economy, that the external value of the dollar is important, and that the
restoration of price stability will automatically strengthen the external
value of the dollar. Policy which views the exchange rate as an indepen-
dent target or, even worse, as an independent instrument is likely to
result in unstable prices. Furthermore, if monetary policy succeeds in
achieving price stability, it might be useful to allow for fluctuations in the
exchange rate which provide for a partial insulation from misguided
foreign monetary policies.
It is of interest to note that this view that policy which ensures domestic
price stability also creates an environment that is conducive for a stable
dollar was also advocated by Henry Simons over thirty years ago:
The major need for international monetary stabilization will be simply
the internal stabilization of the dollar itself. This is the central prescrip-
tion from which hopeful planning should proceed ... If the dollar
again is violently unstable in purchasing power or commodity value,
and especially if it is again debased irresponsibly by tragically inoppor-
tunate tariff increases or devaluations, world economic order, large
international trade, and decent national behavior in commercial poli-
cies or practices will be unattainable. If we can securely and closely
stabilize our own price level and prevent recurrent aberrations of
inflation and deflation, we can thereby eliminate the major obstacle to
reasonable stability of foreign-exchange rates. Here is perhaps the best
single contribution we can make to resumption of orderly international
trade—to the ending of arbitrary exchange controls (rationing of for-
eign exchange), bilateralism, discrimination, and direct national con-
trol of governmental monopolizing of foreign trade . . . serving well
our national interest in this matter, we may also serve well the cause of
world order and reconstruction, and conversely. [Simons 1948, p. 262.]
Even when monetary policy is not guided by exchange rate targets, it
might attempt to offset disturbances arising from shifts in the demand for
money. Such shifts in demand may be especially pronounced under a
regime of flexible exchange rates. A policy which accommodates such
demand shifts by offsetting supply shifts would reduce the need for costly
adjustments of exchange rates and national price levels. The difficulty
with implementing this policy is in identifying when a shift in money
demand has occurred. Here the exchange rate may be useful as an
indicator for monetary policy, especially when frequent changes in in-
flationary expectations make nominal interest rates an unreliable indica-
tor of fluctuations in money demand. Accordingly, a combination of
rising nominal interest rates and an appreciation of the dollar may indi-207 United States Inflation and the Dollar
cate a rise in the demand for dollars that should be accommodated by an
increase in supply, whereas the combination of rising nominal interest
rates and a depreciation of the dollar may indicate a rise in inflationary
expectations that should obviously not be fueled by an accommodative
change in supply.
9.4.6 Low and Stable Rates of Monetary Expansion
Would Contribute to Economic Stability
An important way in which government policy can make a positive
contribution to restoring price stability and reducing costly and unneces-
sary turbulence in foreign exchange rates is by reducing high and variable
rates of monetary expansion which, for example, result from misguided
attempts to stabilize nominal interest rates. This is especially important
because exchange rates are affected not only by current policy actions but
also by current expectations of future policy. If expectations of future
policy are highly sensitive to current policy, then instability of policy can
have a magnified effect on exchange rates and on the relative prices of
different national outputs, thereby generating significant social costs. If,
as I believe, the instability and unpredictability of policy, particularly
monetary policy, has contributed significantly to the turbulence of ex-
change rates since 1973, then the turbulence and its associated cost can be
reduced. In order to restore order and effectiveness to economic policies
it is important that such policies be perceived as being consistent and
permanent. A track record of erratic policies that are based on attempts
to fine-tune the economy will not promote such a perception.
An open economy under fixed exchange rates cannot have a monetary
rule which ensures a stable growth of nominal balances. In such an
economy the autonomy of the monetary authorities is lost to the commit-
ment to peg the rate of exchange. This autonomy is regained under a
flexible exchange rate regime, but, as was noted above, shifts in the
demand for money are likely to occur. Since it might be desirable to
accommodate such demand shifts, the monetary rule should be formu-
lated with some flexibility so as to allow for occasional accommodations.
During a stabilization program it is likely that some sectors will be
harmed more than others. The principles of the division of responsibili-
ties between monetary and fiscal policies suggest that since monetary
policy is an aggregate policy, it need not be guided by intersectoral
considerations. These intersectoral considerations are, however, ex-
tremely important. The proper instrument for dealing with sectoral dif-
ficulties is fiscal rather than monetary policy.
Recognition of these principles is critical since very frequently the
period of time that the economic system needs for adjustment is likely to
be longer than the period of time the political system is willing to provide.208 Jacob A. Frenkel
In the past this conflict resulted in stop-and-go policies with subsequent
acceleration of the rate of inflation. These costs can be avoided if the Fed
maintains its independence from political pressures.
Once the Fed adopts a stable course of policy, it will minimize the
costly side effects. Put differently, money is felt when it is out of order;
when it is in order, it only serves as a veil over the real equilibrium of the
economy. This unique property of money was best summarized by John
Stuart Mill:
There cannot, in short, be intrinsically a more insignificant thing, in the
economy of society, than money; except in that the character of a
contrivance for sparing time and labour. It is a machine for doing
quickly and commodiously, what would be done, though less quickly
and commodiously, without it: and like many other kinds of machin-
ery, it only exerts a distinct and independent influence of its own when
it gets out of order [Mill 1862, book 3, chapter 7, sec. 3.]
Following a predictable stable course of policy will ensure that money is
in order. Adopting such a course will not eliminate variations of exchange
rates nor will it ensure that exchange rates conform with the predictions
of the purchasing power parity theory. It will, however, reduce some of
the unnecessary and costly fluctuations which are induced by unstable
and erratic policies.
Notes
1. Some of the arguments in this paper draw on Frenkel (1981a, b) and on Frenkel and
Mussa (1980, 1981).
2. I am indebted to Dallas S. Batten for preparing this figure.
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